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LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW-SCHOOL
CURRICULUM *
JoHn DICKINSON

Any consideration of the future course of American legal
education must proceed from recognition of a fundamental fact:
the fact, namely, that the system of legal education which we
have already developed in this country, and which stands embodied in the law-schools belonging to this association, represents
the most original and unique contribution as yet made by the
United States to educational progress in any field. No consideration of possible change or reform can proceed intelligently
without basing itself on this foundation of solid achievement;
and no consideration of possible change or reform is entitled
to hearing unless it involves no impairment or threat of impairment to the efficiency of the structure of legal education which we
already possess.
In this existing structure and the ends and purposes which it
embodies we are fortunate in having a standard by which to test
the promise of proposed reforms. The mere fact that a thing is
new and different should give it no title to adoption; rather it
should impose a burden of proof that the new thing is more in
harmony with the underlying purposes and objectives of our
existing legal education than is the established thing for which
we are asked to substitute it. What we must ask is whether
it is only something new, or whether it is really a better way than
the way we are now using for accomplishing the purposes of
legal education as we envisage them.
The basic question which therefore emerges at the very outset
is the question of what we conceive as the major ends and
purposes of legal education. Do we envisage ends or purposes
at all, or are we so completely habituated to a routine that we
find no room to ask what the routine is for, and feel no need of
standards by which to test it? What is it that we are trying
*An address delivered at the Chicago meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, December i93o.
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to do by means of the system of legal education that has been
built up? What is its purpose or objective, by reference to which
the validity of proposed alterations and new advances can be
tested?
As a step toward facing this question it is significant to
note an aspect of our existing system on which externally at least
much of its effectiveness appears to depend: the fact, namely, that
it is a uniform system reproducing itself as nearly as possible in
more than seventy schools throughout the country. The history
of the improvement of American legal education has been notably
the history of this extension of a uniform system and method of
teaching and a uniform offering of subjects from one school to
another and from one state to another until at present the entire
country is embraced within the network of a single educational
system. There are doubtless those to whom this ideal of uniformity is repugnant. Certainly in an era like ours when in every
direction the world is ramifying into one specialty after another,
the ideal of uniformity may well be asked to justify itself. In
the field of legal education it can do so on only one ground,-the
ground, namely, that persons throughout the entire country who
intend to seek and find employment as lawyers will be benefited
in some way if during the period of their training they are submitted to substantially the same educational discipline. If this
is so, and only if it is so, is it desirable to do as we have been
doing and set up a standard type of legal education to serve as a
model for law schools in every state.
At first sight, when we regard the condition of legal practice
today, it may well be asked whether there is any such uniformity
in the business of lawyers, whether to be a lawyer means any
such single thing or unitary group of things, as to make desirable
or even possible a uniform standardized type of legal education.
We all know how many kinds of lawyers there are,-title lawyers,
and trust lawyers, and insurance lawyers, and house-attorneys
for various kinds of business concerns, and tax lawyers, and
corporation lawyers, besides the lawyers who go into court on
the civil and criminal sides. An American lawyer's business is,
after all, very largely business, with some law thrown in, and what
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kind of law is thrown in will depend on the nature of the business.
As any particular lawyer's business takes form, whole departments and topics of legal learning pass out of his ken forever.
A proposal was therefore made a number of years ago that this
diversification of practice should be recognized in legal education,
and that law students should definitely start out to prepare themselves to be different kinds of lawyers, at least within certain
broad groups. The proposal was called a proposal for a "classified bar." It ultimately went to pieces on the ground that there
is after all among the multitude of legal specialties a basic unity,that the specialties so overlap and interpenetrate that a man cannot become a competent specialist until first of all he is a whole
lawyer. It might be added also that at the student stage and even
long afterwards a man can rarely anticipate the particular kind
of specialty to which he will ultimately become attached and
that it is usually determined by accident. In consequence it is the
exceptional man who at the student stage is in a position to
orient his training in the direction of any particular type of
practice.
At this point we come within range of vision of the objective
of legal education for which we are seeking,-that objective seems
nothing short of starting a man on the way to being a whole
lawyer. I hasten to add that we must realize the limitations of
the objective as so defined. It has been noted, I hope, that I did
not say that the objective of legal education was to make a man
a complete lawyer, but only to start him on the way to being a
complete lawyer. We shall have to add furthermore that under
conditions of practice today no lawyer ever arrives at this goal
of completeness toward which his legal education is supposed to
start him. Perhaps it would therefore be better to revise our
method of stating the objective of legal training and say that it
is not to start a man on the way to being a complete lawyer, but
rather to start him on the way to being any variety of lawyer into
which accident and opportunity may later convert him. This
revised statement obviously narrows the task of legal education
by eliminating an impossible ideal of completeness; but still it
rests on a fundamental assumption the boldness of which is not
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always explicitly recognized,-the assumption, namely, that it is
possible to devise a course of legal study which will be equally useful to the student in after life no matter what type or variety of
lawyer he may later develop into.
The whole existing structure of American legal education is
founded on this bold assumption; and acceptance of the assumption gives us the standpoint we were seeking from which to put
questions to existing methods of legal education without challenging the achievement of our system of legal education as a whole.
Is the course of study which is now provided with practical uniformity in all the first class law-schools in the country the best
which it is possible to devise for the purpose of supplying to the
law student the things which he will need, no matter into what type
of practice he later finds his way? Naturally this raises a furiher
question: what are the things which a law student needs, no
matter into what special kind of practice he will later find his
way? Can a law-school supply such things? If it cannot supply
all of them, what are the things it can supply?
It should be seen from the way these questions are put that
there is at least one thing which a law-school ought not to be
asked to supply,-namely, immediate technical competence in the
kind of positions into which its graduates will at once step on
graduation. It is one of the great achievements of our American
law-school education that it has taught the bar and the student
not to regard the law-school as a vocational training-school for
iaw-clerkships. Such vocational training would do nothing for
the student except fit him for trivial and detailed duties which he
will soon work himself out of if he has ability. His law-school
training should not be something which will thus be outgrown
as soon as he comes to responsible professional stature; rather
it should be something which will make him better able to discharge the duties of a responsible position in the profession. For
this reason it cannot consist of the technical details with which
the young graduate is primarily busied immediately on his entry
into practice, and which were long regarded as precisely the things
for which law-school training should prepare. A minor amount
of such training is inevitable in the law-school; but it is inevitable
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not for its own sake, or for the sake of instilling technical proficiency in the student, but for the purpose of acquainting him
with what is after all an important and essential element of the
legal system and of work at the bar.
In this last statement we come, I believe, on the thing which
the law-school can supply to the prospective lawyer that will be
of use to him in any type of practice, in any specialty or combination of specialties, into which he may later find his way, and
which will be of use to him throughout his career-I mean an
initial understanding of the legal system and of the work of the
bar. Doubtless this way of putting the objective of a basic legal
education may seem to many legal educators guilty of misplaced
emphasis. I have emphasized getting an initial understanding of
the legal system; they would doubtless emphasize acquiring the
habit of legal thinking, becoming trained in legal methods of
thought. The reason why I prefer the former method of statement is that it seems to me more comprehensive, and thus to
include the latter, while the latter does not include the former.
No lawyer can doubt that there is something which may be described as a legal habit of thought, impossible as it may be to
define; a lawyer senses very keenly the lack of it when, for example, it is missing from a widely heralded judicial opinion. No
one can doubt that this habit of thought once acquired is useful
in every branch and specialty of practice; that in this sense its
acquisition by the law student equips him with an essential instrument for whatever work he may later perform as a lawyer, and
that in this sense the law-school, in inculcating the method and
habit of legal thinking, performs an indispensable function for all
who are on their way to be lawyers.
I suggest, however, that those who say that all a law-school
can do for its students is to inculcate a habit of legal thought are
in danger of taking an over-simple view of what is meant by
legal thought. For myself I do not believe that the classroom
dialectics of the case system applied indiscriminately to a number of miscellaneous legal topics chosen at random is of itself a
sufficient introduction to the technique of legal thinking. It is a
peculiarity of legal thought that its methods tend to vary with
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different fields of subject-matter to which it is applied. Thus the
technique of analysis and reasoning which apply in the law of
future interests can be differentiated without over-refinement from
those which prevail in the law of torts, and both methods are
again different from those which apply in the various fields of
public law. The sense of the appropriateness of these different
mental approaches and differing methods of analysis and reasoning in different fields of law belongs to what I have called an
understanding of the legal system. It would therefore seem that
an orientation in the different parts of the system and an understanding of the technique and point of view appropriate to each
is an integral part of the process of acquiring what may be called
legal habits of thought.
In this connection it seems not out of place to stress a point
perhaps not always sufficiently considered in discussing or applying the case method of teaching,-the fact, namely, that the
degree of satisfactoriness with which that method is applied
depends in great part on the amount of knowledge external to
the cases immediately under discussion which is brought to their
consideration by students and professor. The satisfactory application of the case-method involves, in other words, more than the
evolution of logical categories of analysis from the inner consciousness of the participants in the discussion,-it frequently
involves bringing the light of outside information to bear on
the situations under discussion. It is from this outside information that fruitful categories of analysis and criticism are supplied rather than from the dialectic subtlety of minds swept and
garnished.
If this be so, it would seem that acquisition of information
by the student cannot be wholly eliminated or even minimized
in framing a law-school curriculum, no matter how much we
may stress the element of training in analysis and legal habits of
thought. The informational side of legal education has tended
to fall into bad odor because it is easy to identify it with the type
of teaching which prevails in what are called "cram schools." A
little reflection should suggest that this identification is overhasty. Because we do not happen to approve the kind of infor-
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mation which is supplied to students in certain schools or of the
way in which it is supplied, we should not close our eyes to the
essential place which knowledge and information hold in all
processes of fruitful thinking. It would seem obvious that a man
cannot do much fruitful legal thinking unless he knows a good
deal of law, and consequently that one of the things which the law
student must do in acquiring legal habits of thought is also to
acquire as much knowledge of law as possible.
Obviously the type of learning to which I have just referred
is something different from a body of information mechanically
put before students with the sole idea of its being immediately
and practically useful to them in their early years of practice.
What I refer to is information which will enable a student to see
more deeply into the processes of legal thinking, to understand
more competently how and why law has come to be what it is, to
grasp with surer touch the policy and spirit of different departments of law, in short, to view law not in a rule of thumb spirit,
but intelligently and understandingly and in the best sense of the
word "scientifically". To reach this result the student must,
however, definitely set out to get information, and he must be
put in the way of getting to know his way about the legal system
as a whole.
This problem of introducing the student to the legal system
is the problem of the law-school curriculum. If the case method
were of itself sufficient to supply the student with all that he needs
by way of legal education the variety and subject-matter of
courses taken by the student would be altogether immaterial.
Many legal educators apparently lean to the view that they are
immaterial. On the other hand the development of the law-school
curriculum during the past fifty years has recognized the importance of subject-matter. Gradually courses have multiplied, new
subjects have been introduced, and an effort has been made to represent every possible field of law by an offering in the catalogue.
What has resulted is that if a student desires an introduction to
any particular field of law it is there for him to obtain at the
price of taking a course. The question, however, may be raised
whether the mere multiplication of courses and the mere repre-
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sentation of all fields of law in the catalogue will, without more,
accomplish the objective of introducing the student to the legal
system in the sense in which such an introduction will be of the
greatest value to him. We here come to grips with the interesting problem of whether it may not be worth while at the present
time to scrutinize the standard curriculum of our American lawschools with a view to a possible modification in a very limited and
definite direction.
The multiplication of course-subjects in our law-chool curriculum has reached the point where the student can take only
a selection from the total number of courses offered. This means
that he must definitely omit certain topics or fields of law from
his law-school studies. The result practically everywhere is that
the selection which students make is dictated by a directly vocational motive,-the students select courses which they think will
provide information immediately useful in practice or useful at
least in passing bar examinations. In consequence a certain list
of courses tend to monopolize the time of law students throughout the country during the second and third years of their lawschool work. These courses lie almost exclusively within the
fields of contract and property law,-courses in bills and notes,
agency, sales, trusts, suretyship, mortgages, partnership, future
interests, wills, and the like-all vitally important and necessary
subjects in which no law student should miss the opportunity of
becoming oriented during his law-school course. Recognizing,
however, the indispensable character of these subjects, the question
arises whether, from the standpoint of sound legal education, it
is necessary or wise to allow them as at present to practically
monopolize the attention of law students, or whether it is desirable
and possible to find a way of adjusting their claims to claims of
other departments of the law which are now virtually excluded.
From a narrowly vocational standpoint there is no room for
doubt that the existing monopoly of the law student's attention
by courses of the kind which I have named is fully defensible.
That is to say, in these courses the student does pick up a variety
of concrete information for which he is more likely to have direct
use in practice than he would have for any other information with
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which he might be brought into contact. If, therefore, we conceive the function of the law-school as that of supplying the
student with information immediately useful, there is no ground
for raising any question about the existing situation or for
feeling that there is any room for improvement. However,
almost the one thing on which legal educators seem agreed is
that it should at least not be the primary function of legal education to supply students with information which will be immediately useful to them in practice. They seem agreed that the
purpose of legal education must be broader and deeper than this;
and if they are right in so thinking, then it would appear that a
serious challenge is thrown down by the fact that the bulk of the
students' last two years in law-school is expended in work which
is elected with an immediately practical objective to the exclusion
of their forming even a preliminary acquaintance with other
significant branches of the legal system.
It is this fact that there are whole areas of the law with which
under the present system the majority of law-school students never
even form a bowing acquaintance that causes the problem and the
difficulty. There can be no complaint that the student should
wish to orient himself in fields of law like bills and notes, agency,
sales, future interests, partnership, and the others which I have
enumerated. Of course he should; the problem arises because,
if he wishes to do this, he must, as matters now stand, give up
the opportunity of making an initial acquaintance with such
widely different topics as family law, public utilities, taxation,
labor law, corporate finance, administrative law, international law,
and the whole vexed question of procedure and procedural reform,
civil and criminal. Of course, it is not nearly so likely that the
young lawyer will be called on to deal in his practice with cases
drawn from these latter fields as from the standard commercial
subjects. However, this is precisely one of the arguments for
introducing him to them during his law-school work, if we do
not adopt the narrowly vocational concept of legal education. In
other words if the objective of the law-school curriculum is not
to cram the student with information available for immediate
use in practice, but rather to introduce him to the legal system
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as a whole, there would seem every reason why his time should
not be monopolized by courses chosen because of their practical
subject-matter to the exclusion of other departments of law
wherein the problems involved and the method of approach and
reasoning differ so importantly from the commercial branches
that a lawyer who is trained exclusively in the latter subjects is
never likely fully to understand the former. In other words, are
we really providing for students that introduction to the law as a
whole which is the only sound objective of a legal education if in
fact we make it practically impossible for them to obtain, in the
course of their training, an introduction to important branches
of the law which, without such an introduction, they are never
later to understand?
If the view is taken that from the sheer standpoint of available time it is not possible to introduce the law student to the
fields of law just mentioned and at the same time permit him to
acquire vitally necessary practical knowledge in the fields of
contract and property law, a downright dilemma appears presented between what may be called the vocational and the educational attitudes towards legal education. If, however, we are willing for the moment to adopt something approaching the vocational point of view, I believe that it will paradoxically enough
solve this dilemma. The vocational point of view insists that
students shall take courses like bills and notes, agency, sales,
suretyship, etc., because of the utility of such courses for actual
practice. This is the reason and excuse for these courses and
not their special fitness for training the mind or revealing the basic
processes of legal thinking. If this purely practical point of
view be sustained, the question at once arises as to whether these
courses are not under the existing system permitted to consume
a much larger amount of classroom time than they would be
entitled to if their dominantly vocational value were definitely
recognized as their chief excuse for existence. In other words
is it not possible so to compress some of these courses as to leave
room to introduce the student to other kinds of subject-matter to
which he must be introduced if he is to visualize the system of law
as a whole?
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On this point I have said in another place: I
"The principal objection to compressing the subjectmatter of courses is a pedagogical one connected with the use
of the case-method of teaching. This method, if exploited
to its full possibilities, requires an ample amount of classroom time to develop a single point, and the total number of
points that can be covered in even a full year's course is
therefore severely limited. This slowness of progress
means that the students are having constant practice in legal
analysis. Its justification, in other words, consists in its
value as a training exercise in legal habits of thought, which
is bought at the price of reducing the amount of law to
which a student can be introduced in a given time. The
practical question is to determine the point at which this
price becomes too high to pay. In other words, one might
well ask in the case of a subject like sales whether it would
not be advantageous to reduce the total number of points
in the course which are developed by full case analysis in
order to bring the course within shorter compass, and rely
on developing the remaining points by discussion incidental
to those points which are developed directly by means of the
cases. This is what is to some extent hctually done in all
courses in view of the fact, . . . that every course-subject

contains at least enough material to fill out several courses of
a full-year's length. If some of the courses, like sales and
bills and notes, for example, now usually given in the second
year of the law-school curriculum, were to be compressed in
this way into shorter compass it would be possible for the
student at the end of his second year to have covered most
of the 'indispensable' subjects except two or three, such as
corporations and conflict of laws, which would have to be
taken in the third year. This would leave a much larger
amount of time than at present for the student to distribute
in his third year among 'elective' courses."
These electives at present include the various legal topics of a
primarily non-commercial and non-property character for which
there is at present no room in the student's schedule.
I do not believe that compression in the manner suggested
is validly open to the objection that it means lowering the standard of teaching. It is only compression of the same kind which
'J.

Dickinson, Making Lawyers (1929)
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we already have to practice to bring any topic of law within the
limits of a full year's course no less than of a half year's course.
To be sure, its successful application would doubtless require skill,
but so does every other part of teaching activity. The point of
doubt, therefore, seems to me not the difficulty of compression,
but rather, whether the effort would be repaid by the result,whether the new material for which an opening would thus be
made in the curriculum is really important enough to justify making the effort of disturbing the curriculum as it stands. On this
point there is ground for possible difference of opinion.
No doubt the idea of creating more room in the professional
curriculum of the law-school for topics like administrative law.
problems of procedural reform, corporation finance, and international law, will seem to many hard-headed lawyers and hardheaded law teachers an unnecessary and impractical sacrifice of the
useful to the merely ornamental, of the practical to the purely
theoretical. In this connection it is therefore interesting to hark
back to an age which may not have been quite so practical as our
own, but whose constructive achievements challenge comparison
with ours, and to invoke the examples of Blackstone and Kent.
Blackstone devoted more than 25 per cent. of his Commentaries
to theoretical and public law subjects and Kent devoted almost
30 per cent. to the same topics. One of the valuable results
still to be obtained from reading these classic treatises which helped
to form so many great lawyers is the feeling that one brings
away from them that property law and commercial law are not
the whole of law, but are only parts of a system which embraces within its scope all the fundamental problems of human
and social relations and of human organization and society. Insofar as we close the shutter to the prospective lawyer on all but the
technical, commercial aspects of law we not merely degrade law
from a profession into a mere means of livelihood, but we also
impair the vocational fitness of coming generations of lawyers
to deal with the largest and most important problems which
under our system of government devolve upon the bar. Thus
at present it is probably true in my own field of constitutional
law that there is more misinformation and unsound thinking
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about constitutional questions among members of the bar as a
class than among almost any other class in the community. Not
merely has the average lawyer never obtained a grasp of the
nature of the issues and methods of reasoning appropriate to that
field of jurisprudence, but he constantly intrudes into the consideration of constitutional questions attitudes and habits of
thought derived from altogether different departments of the law;
and this in spite of, or perhaps because of, the fact that constitutional law is the single public-law subject which the curriculum
makes it possible for most students to study in law-school.
It is not, however, primarily in the interest of public-law
subjects, important as those may be, that consideration is here
proposed of a possible modification of the curriculum. Perhaps even more important is the desirability of bringing the
student into contact with other non-commercial fields of lawwith labor law, with legislation under the police power, and most
importantly with fundamental problems of procedure and procedural reform which make it necessary for him to assume a
critical, legislative attitude toward the law, and view it from an
independent vantage point as a social instrumentality,-not merely
as something to be learned, and used as learned, but as something
to be analyzed and reflected on and weighed and judged. If it
be said that this is not the attitude toward law which should
be inculcated in law students, the answer is that then our whole
system of legal education has been pointed in the wrong direction
during the fruitful half century just past, and that we should as
rapidly as possible convert our law-schools into cram courses
for bar examinations. If we have been right in the direction
our legal education has been taking during the last fifty years,
and if the sound objective of law-school training is to give future
lawyers an education rather than merely fill them with vocational
information, then it would seem that the time has come for room
to be made for a return to a broader type of legal education than
the present set-up of the curriculum permits.
In any proposal for tinkering with the curriculum, however,
it is not merely legitimate-it is essential-to inquire how much
havoc the tinkering will work in the established situation. The cur-

LEGAL EDUCATION AND LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

437

riculum is in and of itself a large part of what a law-school is,
and to that extent the more or less standardized curriculum at
present prevailing in the law-schools of this country is an important constituent element of our existing system of legal education. It is therefore well to recur to the caveat which I filed
at the beginning of this paper,-namely that no consideration
of reform should be given serious hearing unless it involves no
threat of impairment to the efficient structure of legal education
which is already functioning. Can it be said that such an alteration in the curriculum as we have been considering would involve
an impairment or disturbance in the existing system?
I cannot see that anything in the nature even of a disturbance
would be involved. Rather, there would be further advance in
a direction in which development has already proceeded. Most
law-schools already offer all the courses the desirability of which
the proposal stresses. There is, therefore, no question of the
elaboration and introduction of new courses. The aim is simply
to broaden access to what is already available. So far as there
would be any practical difficulty, it would be the difficulty involved
in cutting down and compressing essential commercial and property subjects. This would, of course, require the greatest skill and
care, but it is difficult to see anything radical or subversive in it
unless we take the view that there is a divine right of every topic
into which the law has happened to be divided to occupy exactly
one full-year two-hour course in the law-school curriculum. If
this rapidly hardening dogma is shaken off there would seem
no obstacle in the way of adapting the teaching of a given topic
to the amount of time to which the topic seems fairly entitled in
comparison with other topics.
There is another standpoint from which the proposed modification seems to satisfy the test of eligibility. At the commencement of this paper I called attention to the fact that one of the
basic elements in the success and effectiveness of our presentAmerican system of legal education is its uniformity throughout the
country,--the fact that the same system prevails from school to
school and thus forms the basis of a common educational experience, creating a common lingua franca between educated lawyers
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everywhere. My own belief is that this is as it should be. The
very diversity between the multiple types of experience and practice at the bar, so far from calling for corresponding diversity
during the period of legal education, seems rather to impose upon
the educational process the duty of supplying whatever unity,
whatever cohesiveness, the profession is to have. From this point
of view anything which would tend to disrupt and diversify and
specialize into compartments the legal education of prospective
lawyers would be a development to be deplored. It is in this
undesirable direction that the present practice of offering more
law-school courses than a student can take and permitting freedom of election among them is in danger of leading. Personally I regard as wholly sound the instinctive influx of the great
majority of law students into the same courses. I am inclined
to think it would be unfortunate if there were much diversity
between the courses taken by different students. It would tend to
destroy what should be the basic unity of the lawyer's outlook
on the profession and on the legal system as a whole. The danger
that thus lurks in a free election of courses would be lessened
by a modification of the curriculum which would create room
for a wider variety of courses for all students. While opportunity
would exist for particular tudents to orient their work during the
last year of law-school in special directions, this would not be
done, as at present, at the cost of slighting the essential vocational
courses which the great majority of students take. At the same
time it would open to this great majority the opportunity, which
they do not now have, of making the acquaintance of fields of
law to which the profession needs more than ever to be introduced. The result would therefore be to redress the balance in
the direction of more uniform training for all students, which
is in danger of being disturbed if educational progress takes the
line, as it seems otherwise likely to do, of encouraging an ever
wider freedom of election among an ever enlarging offering of
courses.

Furthermore, the modification is one which need in no respect disturb the uniformity of curriculum at present existing
between different schools. It is a modification which, if it should

LEGAL EDUCATION AND LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM

439

prove its feasibility in practice, would be capable of being adopted
without difficulty by law-schools generally. It calls for no diversification between schools, with resulting specialization by one
school in one direction and by another school in a different direction. It would thus permit the continued maintenance of the
standardized type of legal education to which we have won our
way after so much difficulty, and which, whatever may be its
disadvantages, is the surest bulwark against the danger of declining standards and the surest guarantee of a solid foundation from
which to project future progress.
It would, of course, hardly be wise for even so relatively
simple a modification in existing practice to be undertaken at one
and the same time by any considerable number of schools,-what
has been suggested is merely that, if the modification should be
regarded as having justified itself, it is of a kind which could be
generally adopted. Whether or not it will be thought to have so
justified itself as to become entitled to adoption on a wider scale
will depend on its having been first put somewhere into practice
experimentally. What we have done in the past development of
American legal education has been to visely follow a successful
model. If in the present matter we would wish to act with traditional caution, the course indicated would be for a law-school
which was willing to experiment conservatively, and which was in
a position to disregard more radical schemes of reform on the
one hand and on the other hand the pressure from the bar for
more purely vocationalized training, to revise its curriculum in
the direction of compressing into narrower compass that part of
the second and third year work which is now devoted to topics of
commercial and property law, and to fill in the openings thus created with work in other departments of law which would thus be
made available to the bulk of the student body. Inconsiderable as
the change might appear to be, I believe its inauguration would
mark a significant epoch in the history of American legal education.

